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Abstract: In the digital era, information sharing is of
utter importance to improving the quality and benefits
of government services. At present, there is a lot of
information housed by and distributed among different
government agencies, which poses significant
challenges and barriers to information sharing and
dissemination. This paper presents a research model
that examines some crucial factors, including
administrative power, trust, perceived risk, and power
games, that may affect information sharing in
e-Government. The administrative power can be
classified as coercive power and coordinated power.
Trust, perceived risk, and power games are introduced
as moderators of the power on information sharing in
the research model. Results of our empirical study
indicate that coercive power and coordinated power
positively affect information sharing, and such effects
are moderated by trust among employees and power
games. The research and practical implications of this
study are also discussed.

Introduction
In the digital era, e-government is getting more and
more popular. Governments around the world are
implementing innovative e-government systems in
order to provide high-quality e-services [1].
E-government systems can enhance a government’s
daily operations, optimize the service delivery, and
decrease the operation cost. By taking advantage of the
state-of-the-art information and communication
technology, e-government can assist the innovation of
governance processes and improvement of efficiency
and effectiveness of government services, as well as
provide citizens with more opportunities for actively
engaging in government policy making and service
activities [2]. It also provides a new channel for
government officials to access information in and
across government agencies.
Information sharing can strengthen people's
information consciousness, promote the development
and adoption of e-government, and fasten the progress
of government informatization. It can improve work
efficiency, support managerial decision-making, and
lower the administrative cost to satisfy the internal
requirement of e-government construction. For
example, sharing information could enable a service
agency to access and use information owned by other
collaborating agencies directly, which can significantly
reduce the time and cost of searching and acquiring the
needed information from external sources. Despite

those benefits, information sharing is difficult to
initiate or sustain [3]. Another topic in e-government
field is knowledge sharing, which is defined as “the
process through which one unit is affected by the
experience of another” [4]. In this paper, we use these
two terms information sharing and knowledge sharing
interchangeably.
There is an increasing emphasis on the importance of
information sharing in public sectors [4-10]. The
emerging information technologies enable the creation,
collection, integration, management, and sharing of
information and knowledge within and across agencies
through the governmental networks or Internet. Many
researchers have studied the influential factors of
information sharing in the e-government context [3, 4,
10]. Among them, organizational structure, technical
barriers, and social culture are the most studied factors
that impede information sharing. However, there has
been little research about the impact of political factors,
such as administrative power, on information sharing in
the e-government context.
One significant political barrier to information sharing
is people’s tendency to protect the policymaking power
of administrative agencies [3]. Power is viewed as a
critical component that determines people’s
information behavior, which can be explained in term
of power relations existed in the processes that people
are involved with [11].
The purpose of this paper is to examine how power
influences information sharing behavior in government
agencies. Trust, perceived risk, and power games are
expected to moderate the relation between power and
information sharing. The research is conducted through
a survey with employees from five national
government agencies in China to elicit their opinions
on how those factors influence their intention to share
information. All of the selected government agencies
have already established a reliable information
technology infrastructure for e-government. And all of
them use some kinds of information systems to
communicate with others within and across different
departments or to provide services to citizens.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next
section reviews the literature on information sharing in
e-government and introduces the theoretical
background of our research. Then, we present the
research model and hypotheses, followed by
introduction to the constructs and their validity. Next,
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we discuss the data analysis and results. Finally, we
conclude the paper with future research directions.

Literature Review
According to Dawes[3], information sharing is often
limited by technical, organizational, and political
barriers. It’s very important for government agencies to
conduct information sharing effectively by using
computer and network technologies. As Bellamy [6]
points out, the willingness and capacity to share
information among local agencies responsible for
governmental services are considered as the sine qua
non of effective management of cases, the efficient use
of resources, and the prevention of unacceptable
outcomes. But there are so many cases where
information is not shared when it should be, causing
devastating results.
Many scholars have investigated information sharing
among government departments from a variety of
aspects. In particular, organizational factors [12, 13],
technical factors [14, 15], and cultural factors [16] are
the three most examined factors found to influence
people’s information sharing behavior.
The
organizational
characteristics
of public
organizations are different from private organizations.
Compared with private organizations, public
organizations are composed of multiple and competing
interests [17]. Kim and Lee [12, 15] explored how
three
organizational
dimensions,
including
organizational culture, organizational structure, and
information technology, influenced knowledge sharing
capabilities in government agencies. They found three
constructs in the organizational context, social network,
performance-based
reward
systems,
and
IT
infrastructure and application are positively associated
with the level of employee knowledge sharing
capabilities. Willem [4] discussed the organizational
characteristics of public sector organizations, and
focused on specific characteristics of public sector
organizations that would increase or limit
interdepartmental information sharing. Three types of
organization-specific coordination mechanisms, the
member’s social identification, and trust are proposed
and proved to affect the information sharing capability.
An information technology infrastructure is essential to
information sharing. It is also recognized as a basic
obstacle to inspiring information sharing. Landsbergen
and Wolken [14] suggest that interoperability requires
sharing information. They propose an integrated
federal and state government system architecture that
coordinates legal, regulatory, policy, and managerial
approaches to promote inter-department information
sharing. Kim [15] also finds the significant, positive
impact of information technology on information
sharing.
Social culture is another frequent examined factor
affecting information sharing. Drake [16] identified
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and integrated three subcultures within the public
sector (scientist, politician, and bureaucrat) as a
framework to examine information sharing. Keith and
Alan [18] explored employees’ beliefs and attitudes
toward sharing organizational information. They
proposed a model that defined the influence on one’s
intention to share information based on the theory of
reasoned action. Shin [19] investigated the influence of
cultural factors on information sharing in China. It was
postulated that social network structures such as guanxi,
Confucian dynamism, and the level of collectivism
could determine the degree of information sharing [19].
Grounded in the political and economic environment of
China, some authors also proposed several research
models to investigate the factors influencing
information sharing in Chinese governments. For
example, Hu [20] investigated some local government
divisions of China, and proposed that the resources, the
driving force, and the cognitions of information sharing
be the main factors that influence inter-government
information sharing. Fan [21] argues that external
environment, inter-agency partnership, organizational
readiness, and individual expectation are four factors
influencing the degree of realization and the actual
result of information sharing.
Although the prior studies have examined the
influential factors of information sharing in
e-government from a number of perspectives,
especially from organization, technology, and culture
aspects, the research on the relationship between
political factors and information sharing is still rare. As
one of the essential political factors, power is
considered to affect the information behavior directly
[11]. However, it remains unclear whether and how the
power relation among employees affects information
sharing behavior significantly. In addition, most prior
studies were conducted in western developed countries.
China is a developing country, and it possesses some
unique culture and government characteristics. Aiming
to fill the above knowledge gaps, this study explores
the influence of power relation on e-government
information sharing in China.
Researchers in the information systems discipline have
suggested that there would be a relationship between
information and power [11, 22]. The possession of a lot
of information can also be a source of power [23].
Furthermore, researchers have also shown that power,
as a pivotal factor, influences people’s information
behavior [11]. For example, power could determine
people’s motivation to share and the direction of
information flows [24].
Power is exercised and exists in the actions of
information sharing. Although some researchers [25,
26] propose that the power may affect people’s
intention to share information, the quantitative and
systematic evidence does not exist. This paper will
explore how power affects the e-government
information sharing, what is the difference between
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coercive power and coordinated power’s influence on
information sharing, and what moderates such
influence in Chinese e-government context.

Research Model and Hypotheses
Development
Classification of Power
Power is an elusive concept that has a variety of
meanings but without a universally accepted definition.
Farace [27] regards power as a relation between forces
that exists only in relationships. French and Raven [28]
define power as the ability of the management to
influence behavior, intentions, attitudes, beliefs,
emotions, or values of subordinates. Alternatively,
power can also be seen as a personal trait, or as a
consequence of position within a hierarchy [29].
Extant literature has classified power according to
sources or bases, which are referred to as power bases.
The most common classification scheme of power
bases is proposed by Raven [30], which includes
coercive, expert, legitimate, referent, and reward power.
Coercive power is based on the target’s belief that the
manager has the ability to punish employees; expert
power is based on the target’s belief that the manager
can provide him or her with special knowledge;
legitimate power is based on the target’s perception
that the manager has the legitimate right to influence
the target and that he or she is obligated to comply;
referent power is based on the target’s identification
with or desire to be associated with the manager; and
reward power is based on the target’s belief that the
manager has the ability to provide him or her with
desired tangible or intangible objectives.
Hunt and Nevin [31] classified various power sources
into coercive and non-coercive (coordinated) sources.
Among Raven’s five powers, the coercive power is
distinct from others because it alone involves potential
punishment. The other four powers are non-coercive
sources of power, because an individual willingly
yields power to another. Hunt and Nevin proposed a
model of power and established a franchise channel of
distribution to demonstrate the validity of the coercive
and non-coercive sources of power [31].
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Because it is meaningful to dichotomize various power
sources into coercive and non-coercive sources, and the
existing literature points out the extreme difficulty in
empirically differentiating various non-coercive
sources of power [31, 32], this paper will adopt the
power classification model of Hunt and Nevin.
Research Model and Hypotheses
Based on extensive literature review, the research
model is shown in Figure 1.
Power is regarded as a pervasive phenomenon in many
aspects of individual lives, including the aspects
emanating from work roles performed by individuals
[11]. When investigating information sharing among
government agencies, there will always be power
issues involved. If the power is exercised properly, it
would promote the successful implementation of
information sharing. Conversely, the abuse of power
will hinder information sharing. Coercive power and
coordinated power have significant impact on the
majority of knowledge acquisition attributes and are
likely to affect employees’ knowledge sharing. While
being considered in the relationship across public
agencies, power implies that one agency has the ability
to affect the decisions of others [33]. Chia-chen Wang
[26] investigated the inter-organizational relationship
in the manufacture industry in Taiwan, and argued that
regardless of the source of power-coercive punishments
or non-coercive rewards, power would increase the
level of information sharing. In e-government, the
partners of an agency might ask the agency to share
information, and the agency would be forced to share it
because of the inter-organizational relationship,
agreement, the expected benefit, and the possible
punishments or legal actions. Hence we propose the
first two hypotheses as follows:
H1: The coercive power is positively associated with
information sharing in e-government.
H2: The coordinated power is positively associated
with information sharing in e-government.

Trust is a person’s willingness to depend on and belief
in his/her collaborators. Trust will help organizations
establish and maintain a long-term cooperation relation
[10]. Kim [15] proposed that trust in organizational
Coercive
H1
culture would promote active knowledge sharing
Power
among employees and that trustworthy behavior
Information would fasten communication by empowering
H3a
coworkers to freely share personal knowledge. High
H4a
Sharing
levels of employee trust can lead to better knowledge
H2
Coordinated
sharing. Panteli [34] studied the relation between
H5a
Power
power and trust in virtual teams. He examined the
H4b
H5b
power effect in high- and low-trust global virtual
H3b
teams. Results revealed that in high-trust teams, power
Perceived
shifted among team members and the power
Trust
Power
Risk
differentials were minimized. The developed trust
Game
minimizes the use of power in pursuit of a
Figure 1. Research Model
collaborative and productive relationship. Yeung [35]
examined the influence and interaction effect of
coercive power and trust on supplier integration. He
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posited that the use of power would increase internal
integration with a higher level of trust. Furthermore,
internal integration mainly concerns the integration of
employees, information flow, and processes from
different functions within a company.
In e-government, a higher level of trust can motivate
agencies to invest in inter-agency collaboration. Such
investment can be viewed as a commitment to the
relationship [35]. The information providers believe
that the information requester will not take advantage
of them through opportunistic behaviors. In such a
situation, when the requester asks providers to share
information through the use of power, no matter if it is
coercive power or coordinated power, it will be
considered as a suggestion that is beneficial to all
parties. Thus the providers will accept the suggestion
and take actions. Although the requesters use power to
affect providers, the providers prefer to share
information because organizational studies have shown
that there is a mitigating effect of trust on people’s
reactions to unfavorable exchange outcomes [36]. As a
result, the use of power will be looked upon as a driver
for information sharing in the trust-based relationship.
However, if providers do not trust requesters, the
requesters’ use of power on providers’ internal
decisions will be viewed as attempts for future
opportunistic behaviors. This will actually damage the
relationship and decrease the providers’ intention to
share information. Therefore, we propose the following
hypotheses:
H3a: The level of trust among employees would
positively affect the impact of coercive power on
information sharing in e-government.
H3b: The level of trust among employees would
positively affect the impact of coordinated power on
information sharing in e-government.
Risk is typically defined in terms of the trustor’s belief
about the likelihood of gains and losses [37, 38].
Because it is difficult to measure risk objectively, the
literature pays more attention on the perception of risk.
Perceived risk is defined as the people’s subjective
expectation of suffering a loss in pursuit of a desired
outcome [39]. Perceived risk is caused by behavioral
and environmental uncertainty. Behavioral uncertainty
exists because online service providers may behave in
an opportunistic manner by taking advantage of the
impersonal nature of the electronic environment, while
environmental uncertainty arises due to the
unpredictable nature of Internet-based technology that
is beyond the control of consumers.
Research on e-commerce has suggested that the higher
perceived risk will mitigate the users’ intention to share
information and complete transactions [38]. The
perceive risk is also found to have the similar negative
effect on e-government adoption [39, 40]. Once
employees of a government organization perceive the
existence of a risk, they will feel anxious and be afraid
to be responsible for information leakiness. The higher

the perceived risk, the less the information sharing.
When people are asked to share information, they will
determine the degree of risk, including requesters’
possible opportunistic behavior and the uncontrolled
information technology. If the perceived risk exceeds
the impact of power, they prefer to retain the
information rather than share it. Thus, the following
hypotheses are derived.
H4a: Increased perceived risk could weaken the impact
of coercive power on information sharing in
e-government.
H4b: Increased perceived risk could weaken the impact
of coordinated power on information sharing in
e-government.
Power games refer to the unjustified use of power for
personal reasons, for instance, to enrich oneself or
one’s department or to increase one’s control in the
organization [4]. It is important to highlight that
information is becoming the source of power in the
current digital era and this power moves to the
information source [34, 41]. Those who possess or
have access to certain information can use it to further
their interests. The use of the metaphor “information is
power” demonstrates the influence of information on
the power shift process [11]. In the information sharing
process, such power games can be used for hoarding
one’s information. If employees get the feeling that the
power is lost in the ongoing process, their belief in the
sharing efforts will fade out. But most government
employees think the information exchange will
enhance their knowledge and improve their problem
solving ability. At the same time, their information
belongs to the government. They will not lose any
power after the sharing. The more information sharing,
the more chance they could have. In the presence of
power games, government employees know
collaborator’s reaction for their information hiding
behavior. They don’t want to ruin the relationship. If
government employees know how to maximize the
benefit from information sharing, they would like to
exchange information in the presence of power games.
So we propose the final hypotheses as follows:
H5a: Power games will positively affect
coercive power on information
e-government.
H5b: Power games will positively affect
coordinated power on information
e-government.

the impact of
sharing in
the impact of
sharing in

Research Methodology
Instrument development
We developed a survey instrument to measure the
proposed constructs for examining the underlying
factors that may contribute to the intention toward
information sharing. Questions were compiled and
adapted from validated instruments used in the
literature to measure each construct, and wording was
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modified to fit the Chinese e-government context.
Specifically, items for coercive power(CP) and
coordinated power (NCP) were adopted/extended from
Brown’s study [42]; items for trust (T) and the
intention to information sharing (IS) were adapted from
Kim’s study [15]; perceived risk (PR) was adapted
from Fu [43]; items for power games (PG) were
adopted from Willem [4]. Each item was rated using a
seven-point Likert scale, with 1 indicating strongly
disagree and 7 indicating strongly agree.
In order to assess the construct validity of the various
items, we attempt to identify any particular items that
may be ambiguous through three ways: expert review,
item sorting, and a pilot study.
In the expert review and item sorting stages, we invited
two groups of experts separately to discuss their
understanding of those questionnaire items and
comment on whether those items can accurately reflect
the theoretical constructs or not. The first panel of
experts included four professors from different Chinese
universities. They are familiar with the survey research
methodology and have been engaging in e-government
information sharing research. The experts in the second
group were managers from different government
agencies with a clear idea about the current status of
information sharing in e-government. According to the
results of the review and sorting, we removed some
question items that were reported to be indigestible,
ambiguous, and difficult to represent the constructs.
For example, an original question “relationships
between people of different units can be rather
strained” was excluded from the construct of power
games. In addition to evaluating question items, experts
also helped us double check the format of the original
questionnaire, including a variety of statements and
time limits for the questionnaire.
A pilot test was then conducted with MPA (Master of
Public Administration) students in a Chinese university
to ensure that the instrument had acceptable reliability
and validity. The selected MPA students were working
as public servants in government agencies and they had
good knowledge and understanding about information
sharing in e-government. We used SPSS to check the
reliabilities and conducted confirmatory factory
analysis. All constructs in the pilot test showed
satisfactory internal consistency. In this study, each
alpha are higher than 0.6, the recommended threshold
value [44]. Except power game, all alpha value exceed
the recommended minimum acceptable level of 0.70
[45]. Moreover, we performed confirmatory factory
analysis to measure convergent and discriminant
validity of the items. In this analysis, some items
showed weak loadings. They should be higher than 0.5
[46]. Finally, seven incongruent items were eliminated.
The final survey included six constructs and
twenty-two items, as well as demographic and
self-reported usage items.

Participants
For the research project, the target population was the
staff members of public government organizations in
China that have established some kinds of
e-government systems with a basic information sharing
platform and IT infrastructure. In order to choose
appropriate organizations, we visited several Chinese
ministries and interviewed their IT managers to ensure
the selected organizations met our requirements.
Finally, Ministry of Education, Ministry of Industry
and Information Technology, National Development
and Reform Commission, General Administration of
Customs, and Ministry of Human Resources and Social
Security were chosen as target organizations for the
questionnaire distribution. They all have a good IT
infrastructure and some kinds of e-government
information systems operated to streamline the service
processes across different departments.
From the departments and the employee list of selected
ministries, the first author and the contact persons at
each ministry, who are most IT managers of the
ministry, selected a number of potential participants to
send the survey questionnaire. The candidates must
have involved in some types of information collection,
storage, processing, or dissemination. They should also
have the experience with sharing information through
some kinds of information systems. A total of 395
surveys were delivered to the identified participants in
five ministries by email in April 2010. In order to
improve the return rate, we offered a gift valued US$10
to each respondent. Furthermore, ten respondents were
randomly selected to be rewarded a $80 cash bonus.
At last, 182 questionnaires were returned (46.1 percent
response rate). Eight of them were discarded because
they were incomplete, resulting in 174 usable
questionnaires. Fifty-nine percent of the participants
were male. Age of participants ranged from 22 to 60
years old, and sixty-six percent of the participants were
between 25 and 34 years old. The years of
governmental working experience ranged from 1 to 30
years, and most respondents have worked in
government organizations for 2 ~ 5 years. Regarding
respondents’ job position, thirty-nine percent were
staffs responsible for the daily operation; fifty-nine
percent were middle-level managers in a ministry
department; and two percent were department directors
in the ministry.

Results
Descriptive statistics
Means and standard deviations of constructs are
reported in Table 1. The value range of the variables is
between 1.0 and 7.0. In order to compute descriptive
statistics, multiple-item scales were averaged.
Cronbach’s alpha estimates of constructs are reported
in Table 2.
The alpha value of the whole
questionnaire is 0.768, and most of the constructs also
have a alpha value exceeds the recommended
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minimum acceptable level of 0.70 [45]. That means the
questionnaire has a good internal consistency.
Table 1. Means and Standard Deviations
Variable
Mean
Std. Dev.
NCP
5.13
1.45
CP
4.47
1.64
T
5.21
1.25
PR
4.28
1.58
PG
5.45
1.32
IS
5.23
1.42
Table 2. Cronbach’s Alpha Values
Variable
Items Cronbach’s α
NCP
3
0.702
CP
5
0.780
T
4
0.798
PR
4
0.792
PG
2
0.669
IS
4
0.632
Measurement model
The principal component analysis was conducted to
assess convergent and discriminant validities of the
multi-dimensional constructs. The 22 items used to
measure 6 research variables were subjected to
principal component analysis with varimax rotation.
The Kaiser–Meyer–Olkin measure of sampling
adequacy was 0.71, confirming the appropriateness of
proceeding with the analyses. Factors with Eigen
values larger than one were extracted, resulting in six
factors. Table 3 presents the result of the principal
components analysis.
Convergent validity assesses the consistency across
multiple operationalizations. As shown in Table 3, all
estimated standard loadings of items on the expected
factor are larger than 0.5, suggesting good convergent
validity [47]. Moreover, discriminant validity
represents the extent to which different constructs
diverge from one another. As shown in Table 3, most
items have standard loadings lower than 0.4 on
constructs they were not supposed to measure,
indicating good discriminant validity [47].
Regression Analysis
We ran multiple regression analyses to test the
hypotheses. Coordinated power and coercive power
were independent variables, and information sharing
was the dependent variable. Trust, perceived risk, and
power games were moderator variables. The moderator
variables will affect the independent variables’
influence on dependent variables. Such moderating
effect is also referred to as interaction effects in
regression analysis. The interaction effect is
represented as the product of the independent variable
and moderator variable.

Table 3. Results of Principal
Component Analysis
Factor
1
2
3
4
5
NCP1 .179 -.059 .237 -.044 .827
NCP2 .084 .066 .162 .132 .815
NCP3 .120 -.139 .072 .449 .558
CP1
.817 .028 .046 -.051 .049
CP2
.841 .094 -.045 -.178 .102
CP3
.683 .024 .067 .166 .129
CP4
.556 .074 .151 .293 .233
CP5
.580 .147 -.008 .144 .007
T1
.019 -.070 .816 .140 .030
T2
.018 -.054 .820 .052 .215
T3
.080 -.029 .801 .048 .060
T4
.021 .060 .653 .093 .176
PR1
.143 .745 -.048 -.045-.155
PR2
.115 .763 -.080 .002 .062
PR3
.173 .830 -.070 .018 .031
PR4
-.135 .786 .101 -.119-.016
PG1
.053 .063 -.041 -.049 -.122
PG2
.114 .068 -.006 .056-.022
IS1
.130 -.300 .310 .550 .035
IS2
.016 -.197 .110 .797 .169
IS3
.077 .218 .023 .746 .026
IS4
.422 -.036 .075 .508-.001
Items

6
-.026
-.152
.045
.089
.011
.146
.299
-.150
-.047
-.106
-.077
.240
.085
.067
-.014
.026
.851
.843
.045
-.034
-.011
.081

The regression model is derived as follows:
ISi=β0+θ1NCPi+θ2CPi+β1Ti+β2PRi+β3PGi
+γ1NCPTi+γ2NCPPRi+γ3NCPPGi
+τ1CPTi+τ2CPPRi+τ3CPPGi+εI
(1)
where i represents the subject i, and β,θ,γ and τ are
predicted parameters; ε is the random error; NCPT is
the product of NCP and T; NCPPR is the product of
NCP and PR; NCPPG is the product of NCP and PG;
CPT is the product of CP and T; CPPR is the product
of CP and PR; CPPG is the product of CP and PG.
We used the Hierarchical Multiple Regression method
to analyze the collected data. In the first phase, only for
the analysis in which sharing information was the
dependent variable, two independent variables, namely
coordinated power and coercive power, were entered in
a hierarchy. We refer this model as Model 1. Then, the
Model 2 added trust, perceived risk, and power games
as independent variables that influence the information
sharing intention. The third stage included the
interaction effect between coordinated power and
moderator variables. Finally, the Model 4 considered
the interaction effect between coercive power and
moderator variables based on Model 3. Table 4 shows
the multiple regression analysis results for the four
models.
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Table 4. Results of Multiple Regression Analysis
Variable
Model1 Model2 Model3 Model4
NCP
0.248** 0.198** 0.235** 0.246**
CP
0.187** 0.204** 0.240** 0.223**
T
0.153
0.209
0.173
－
PR
-0.098 -0.125 -0.145
－
PG
0.067
0.104
0.103
－
Moderating Effect
NCP*T
0.227** 0.203**
－
－
NCP*PR
-0.035 -0.070
－
－
NCP*PG
0.205* 0.202*
－
－
CP*T
0.073
－
－
－
CP*PR
0.071
－
－
－
CP*PG
0.026
－
－
－
F
14.668 7.663
6.646
4.914
2
0.163
0.194
0.247
0.238
R（adjusted）
Note: N=174; * p<0.05; ** p<0.01
Based on the above results, hypotheses H1 and H2 are
supported. H3 and H5 are partially supported, And H4
is not supported.
Discussion
Coercive power and coordinated power (Non-coercive
power) have shown significant positive influence on
information sharing in e-government in China. Results
show that government employees would like to provide
and share information with other departments
regardless of power type. Meanwhile, the results also
show that the coordinated power’s impact on
information sharing is greater than the impact of
coercive power, which is different from our intuition.
That means the main concern of information sharing is
the possible mutual beneficial cooperation, regardless
of the possible punishment and accountability.
The interaction effect of trust on coercive power is not
significant. Trust does not seem to affect coercive
power’s influence on information sharing. Coercive
power is based on the ability to give punishment. No
matter whether the trust relation is established or not,
an information provider will share information to avoid
the possible punishment.
Trust really has a positive effect on the relation
between coordinated power and information sharing. It
shows that the trust will increase the intention to share
information. The trust-based relationship will reduce
the possibility of opportunistic behaviors and enhance
the influence of coordinated power. In order to
motivate information sharing, government agencies
should try to establish a mechanism to support building
trust relationship with others.
Perceived risk doesn’t have the significant effect on the
relation between power and information sharing. That
means the hypothesis H4 is not supported. This is
related to the data source. The questionnaires are
collected from government ministries. In China, all the

ministries set up a safe information network and have
very strict regulations on safety protection. Thus, the
perceived risk is not a big concern in the information
sharing process.
Finally, power games do not show significant influence
on the coercive power’s impact on information sharing.
The employees would like to enlarge their control on
the organization through the power from their owned or
accessible information, but that will not influence
government employees’ intention to share or hide their
information resulted from coercive power. Power
games are shown to have a significant positive
interaction effect on the coordinated power’s impact on
information sharing. Information is the source of power.
In order to keep their advantages, some staff will not
share their own information. But government
employees know the rules of power games, and they
understand the potential consequence for not sharing
information. In fact, when they share information with
other agencies, they can get positive response and
receive information they want. Thus they can enhance
their influence and control in the organization.

Conclusion
Information sharing could offer benefits for a
government. Based on the result of previous research,
this paper discusses the influential factors on
information sharing in e-government from a unique
administrative power perspective. The power is divided
into coercive power and coordinated power.
Meanwhile, trust, perceived risk, and power games
were examined as moderator variables that either
promote or mitigate the impact of the power. We tested
the hypotheses through the distribution of a survey
questionnaire to five ministries in China.
The survey results demonstrate that the coercive power
and coordinated power have a significant positive
impact on information sharing in e-government. The
coordinate power’s influence is greater than that of
coercive power. Moreover, trust among employees and
power games have the positive interaction effect on
coordinated power’s effect on information sharing.
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